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ZONING IN SUBURBIA
by

DONALD FOHRMAN*

THE PROBLEM
I.
The suburban landowner who desires to use or develop his
property for a purpose prohibited by a local zoning ordinance
faces the deluge of inconsistencies and inequities in local administrative agencies. Although the aggrieved landowner can
usually seek vindication of his rights through judicial review
of local zoning appeals decisions,' he, nevertheless, due to the injustices of local administrative proceedings and the judiciary's
reluctance to assume dominant control over zoning disputes,
may never receive a fair and equitable adjudication of his rights.
This article will first focus on the plight of a hypothetical
Illinois suburbanite seeking rezoning of his property, presently
zoned for single-family dwellings, to permit the construction
of a large and profitable apartment complex. This produces
vehement opposition from the adjacent property owners who
envision their security, financial investment, and safety to be
in grave danger. Hence, the prospect of the invasion of an
apartment complex into the suburb, composed predominantly
of single-family dwellings, provides the impetus for exposing
the central issues and problems which face the parties to zoning
disputes in Illinois' administrative agencies and courts.

A. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
In the present economic and legal climate, incentives are
available not only to the suburban landowner, but to the developer, investor, or lender as well. The ensuing discussion
will include an enumeration and analysis of the various factors
motivating and deterring the landowner, developer, and investor,
and also the Illinois judiciary's pronouncements on the validity
of the arguments espoused by these individuals.

(1)

THE LANDOWNER

The price paid for open land in a suburban area is highly
speculative, varying greatly with the expected density 2 of the
* B.S., University of Illinois; J.D., Loyola University. Mr. Fohrman
is presently serving as Assistant Attorney General in the Industrial Commission Division of the Attorney General's Office of Illinois.
' Administrative Review Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §264 (1967).
2 For example, as a general rule, land bought for 15 cents per square
foot for single family dwellings is worth 75 cents per square foot appraisal
for apartments. Murray, How To Make Money Building Apartment Houses,
11OUSE AND HOME, Oct. 1960, at 144.
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development; the higher the permitted density, generally, the
higher the land value. Since densities are usually higher in
multi-family dwellings, it is generally of financial advantage for
the suburban landowner to construct multi-family rather than
single-family units on his property. However, the suburbanite whose property is located in a low density zoning district, permitting construction of single-family dwellings only,
would be denied a building permit by the local enforcement
official, building inspector, or town clerk for the development of
a multi-family housing complex. Thus, in his quest for justice
and financial remuneration for his property, the landowner
could seek redress of his grievances from the local zoning board
of appeals, since he is a "person aggrieved" as prescribed by
the statute.3
Alternatively, however, the landowner could avoid a confrontation with the local administrative agency by bringing
a direct judicial appeal alleging that the effect of the zoning
ordinance as a whole is to constitutionally impair the value of
his property and destroy its marketability4 After expounding
the above principle, the court in Bright v. City of Evanston
proceeded to establish the premise for the exhaustion of the
administrative remedies doctrine when it stated:
[W]here the claim is merely that the enforcement or application
of a particular classification to the plaintiff's property is unlawful
and void, and no attack is made against the ordinance as a whole,
judicial relief is appropriate 5 only after available administrative

remedies have been exhausted.
Notwithstanding the complexities involved in selecting the
appropriate forum and remedy, the landowner's primary contention will be financial deprivation due to the application of the
zoning ordinance. However, the Illinois courts have been for the
most part hostile to plaintiffs who seek to invalidate local zoning
ordinances or obtain an exemption from their application on
the theory of financial hardship. In Urann v. Village of Hinsdale,6 the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the validity of the
Village's zoning ordinance where the plaintiff sought a reclassification of his property from single-family to multi-family
dwellings in order to construct apartments. Expert witnesses
testified that the lots would be worth $200-$250 a foot if zoned
for 'single-family dwellings but $350-$400 a foot if zoned for
apartments. Although the court balanced the respective interests of the landowner seeking to derive the greatest economic
use of his property against the right of the adjacent residents
IuL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, §11-13-2 (1961).
4Bright v. City of Evanston, 10 Ill. 2d. 178, 139 N.E.2d 270 (1956).
5 Id. at 185, 139 N.E.2d at 274.

a 30

Ill. 2d 170, 195 N.E.2d 643 (1964).
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to secure the value of their property from diminution where
extenuating circumstances exist,7 it still rejected the plaintiff's
financial deprivation contention.
In contrast, the court in Ehrlick v. Village of Wilmette,8
through its injunctive power, abrogated the harsh and inequitable application of the zoning ordinance to the particular property
of the plaintiff. Here the plaintiff-landowner's property was
classified by the village zoning ordinance as within a residential
district, even though it fronted on a business street and was

opposite a railroad passenger station. The property was worth
only about $50 per front foot as residential property, as compared to $350 to $400 per front foot as apartment property.
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the suburban landowner contemplating the construction of apartments
in contravention of local zoning ordinances will not prevail by
asserting the theory of financial hardship, if: (1) the financial
benefit accruing to him as a result of a zoning reclassification
produces a corresponding decrease in the property values of the
adjacent residents, or (2) he cannot prove that, due to extenuating circumstances, the strict application of the zoning ordinance
would produce inequitable and severe financial consequences.
(2)

DEVELOPER OR BUILDER

The builder or developer also has incentives to construct
multi-family dwellings. The high cost of suburban land has
effectively priced many prospective single-family dwelling purchasers out of the market and into the market for multifamily dwelling units. The housing shortage of the 1940s
has given way to a surplus of single-family subdivision residences in many areas." Thus, the logical alternative for the
real estate developer is the construction of apartment buildings.
The developer or builder who purchases suburban real estate subject to a pre-existing zoning classification prohibiting
construction of apartment buildings will encounter some difficulty in securing effective and unprejudicial administrative and
judicial relief. Opposition to the contract-vendee's right to relief is manifest by two primary theories. First, in order to
comply with the jurisdictional requirements prescribed by the
Illinois Enabling Act 0 and most local zoning ordinances,- the
claimant must be a "person aggrieved" by the application of
the zoning ordinance to his property. Moreover, for the
developer to achieve such a status he must be prepared to
See Ehrlick v. Village of Wilmette, 361 Ill. 213, 197 N.E. 567 (1935).
8 Id.
9 HHFA, Housing Statistics 23, Feb. 1963.
10ILL. Rgv. STAT. ch. 24, §11-13 (1961).
11 See Appendix, art. 16 §1.
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show that he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the enforcement
of the ordinance.12 Further, it should be recognized that the
standing required to question the validity of a zoning ordinance is much greater than the interest required to petition for
amendment of such ordinance.13 Secondly, if the developer can
sustain the burden of proving the requisite degree of direct
injury, he may nevertheless be precluded access to an administrative agency or the courts if the purchase of land was conditioned upon rezoning of the property.
In Jans v. City of Evanston,14 conditional contract purchasers contemplating construction of a multiple dwelling housing development in an area presently zoned exclusively for singlefamily residence, sought a determination that the zoning ordinance as applied to the property was arbitrary and void. The
court, in upholding the validity of the ordinance, stated that "the
law in this state is clear that a purchaser under a contract conditioned upon rezoning has no standing to attack the validity of
'1
the zoning ordinance. 1
Assuming an unconditional contract to purchase and proof
of direct injury, the contract vendee may nevertheless be relegated to a relatively unfavorable position in challenging the
validity of the zoning ordinance. However, in LaSalle National
Bank v. City of Evanston,16 the Illinois Supreme Court declared an ordinance void which arbitrarily zoned the plaintiff's
property for single-family rather than multi-family use. Even
though the plaintiff's beneficiary purchased the land with full
knowledge of the single-family zoning, the court nevertheless
affirmed the plaintiff's right to attack the validity of the preexisting restriction; but added the caveat that a purchaser who
buys property subject to a previously imposed zoning restriction
is not in as favorable a position as one who buys prior to rezoning in reliance upon the existing ordinance.
After the developer establishes his standing to attack the
validity of the zoning ordinance, he will utilize essentially the
same legal theories as those propounded by the landowner.
However, if the local zoning authority can prove that the classification bears a "real and substantial" relationship to public
health, welfare, or safety the ordinance will be upheld by the
Illinois courts. In ascertaining the existence of this "real and
substantial" relationship, the reviewing court will consider
12 Clark Oil and Refining Corp. v. City of Evanston, 23 Ill. 2d 48, 177
N.E. 2d 191 (1961).
1.Id. at 51, 177 N.E.2d at 193.
14 52 Ill. App. 2d 61, 201 N.E.2d 663 (1964).

Is Id. at 71.
16 24 Ill.
2d 59, 179 N.E.2d 673 (1962).
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numerous relevant factors, such as: (1) existing uses and
zoning of nearby property, (2) the extent to which property
values are diminished by the particular zoning restrictions,
(3) the extent to which the destruction of property value
promotes the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of
the public, (4) the relative gain to the public as compared
to the hardship imposed upon the individual property owner,
(5) the suitability of the property for the zoned purposes, and
(6) the length of time the property has been vacant as zoned,
considered in the context of land development in the area."7
Even though these factors or modifications thereof are relatively standardized and consistently applied by the courts to
determine the validity of local zoning ordinances, the actual
determinations of the court are necessarily subjective, since
each zoning case must be decided according to its own facts and
Hence, the suburban landowner and develcircumstances.'
oper contemplating capitalization of the economic incentives
associated with construction of multiple-dwelling units will
encounter insurmountable difficulties in the formulation of coherent litigation plans, including legal theories, expert witnesses, and surveys, due to the effective absence of perceptible
judicial standards for determining the validity of zoning ordinances.
THE INVESTOR
(3)
The investor is also encouraged to invest in multi-family
dwellings. Accelerated depreciation and a low capital gains tax
provide tax incentives for apartment investors. The right
to charge off high percentages of the original cost of a new
building during the early years of the building's life substantially
increases the net anticipated cash flow from the property during
those years, thereby stimulating the construction of new buildings. 19 In addition, the difference between the sale price of the
building and the seller's cost, less the accelerated depreciation, is
taxed only at the lower capital gains rate. 2°
Indirectly, federal policies relating to lending institutions
have also encouraged the construction of multi-dwelling housing in the suburbs. The statutes controlling the Federal Housing Authority and the policy of the Veterans Administration
still favor single-family housing in suburban areas. Nevertheless, F.H.A. policy is not a dominating factor in the area of
multiple-dwelling financing in the suburbs, since the numerous
17 Brookhaven Plaza Corp. v. County of Du Page, 72 Il.
218 N.E.2d 257 (1966).
iS See note 4 supra.

19

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §167(B).

20 d §1231.

App. 2d 224,
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small savings and loan associations, that have always invested in conventional uninsured loans, are the major source
of debt capital for the suburbs.21 The small savings and loan
associations are primarily concerned with the over concentration of single-family dwelling mortgages in their portfolios, as
a result of the increasingly large number of mortgage foreclosures on single-family units which represent a threat to
their financial stability. For example, in 1961 there were
73,074 non-farm real estate foreclosures in the United States,
and 64,399 during the first nine months of 1962.22 In an effort
to minimize this potential loss, the savings and loan associations
are encouraging the construction of multi-family housing. Further, federal restrictions which had limited the extent of their
23
It
investment in multi-family housing have been modified.
can therefore be concluded that the requisite supply of capital
for the construction of multi-dwelling units in the suburbs will
be supplied by various financial institutions, primarily small
savings and loan associations.
(4)
DEMAND
Regardless of the number of incentives motivating the
suburban landowner, developer or builder, and investor, the
number of multi-family housing units that will be constructed
is necessarily limited by their demand. The housing industry
believes there is sufficient demand to support the continued
construction of multi-dwelling units in the suburbs.
The
propositions supporting this conclusion are as follows:
1. People age thirty to forty buy homes, while age
twenty to thirty rent apartments. Since the birth
rate in the 1940s as compared to the 1930s was
relatively high, during the 1970s there will be
many potential tenants but few potential buyers;
2. Increased longevity coupled with social trends
encourage these older people to occupy separate
dwelling units rather than residing with their
children. It is usually more convenient for older
people to rent than buy, thus increasing the
demand for multi-family housing for our elderly
citizens.
3. Many industries are moving to the suburban
21 Babcock and Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom,
111 U. PA. L. Rav. 1040 (1963).
22 Note 9 supra.

23 Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-779 §1 (a), 76 STAT. 778, amending
24 U.S.C.A. §1464 (1961) (codified at 24 U'.S.C.A. 1464(c) (1969))
Act
of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-779, §2, 76 STAT. 779 amending 24 U.S.C.A.
§1422 (1961) (codified at 24 U.S.C.A. 1422 (1) (1969) $.
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areas. Since their employees naturally desire to
live near their place of employment and cannot
afford expensive housing, they will look for suburban multi-family housing.
The demand for multi-family housing should
broaden because of the increased variety in the
types of multi-family housing now being constructed, including low-density row houses, garden apartments, suburban high rises, and condominiums.
Finally, multi-family housing is now being constructed which provides for child care services
and fresh air and quiet, which were previously
associated only with single-family housing. Moreover, the suburban high rise cooperative affords
luxury living in the suburbs which has never pre24
viously been available in multi-family dwellings.

B. SUBURBANITES' REACTION
The reaction of the individual suburbanite to the invasion
of the apartment building into his community has not been entirely consistent, yet it is relatively safe to assume that the
reaction of the majority of suburban residents will be hostile.
In order to effectively evaluate the judicial attitude toward
multi-family dwellings and promulgate possible solutions to the
problems confronting the parties to zoning disputes, an analysis
of the suburbanites' motives, both expressed and silent, logical
and illogical, must be undertaken.
(1)
OSTENSIBLE ARGUMENTS
The so-called "ostensible arguments" are those commonly
shouted by irate suburban residents at local hearings and board
of appeals meetings, legal theories espoused by municipal attorneys defending the validity of the zoning ordinance, and
those incorporated in countless numbers of legal texts, reporters, and treatises. The subsequent discussion will focus on the
most common arguments, providing some insight as to their
internal consistency and the judiciary's determination of their
validity.
(a) Diminution of Property Values
Owners of single-family residences surrounding proposed
apartment development sites frequently argue that the value
of their property will be adversely affected if the zoning law is
modified to permit the construction of multi-family housing
units. This argument seems inconsistent with the fact that
24

See note 21 supra.
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land values in most exisLing apartment areas are high, as previously discussed in the context of the landowner's incentives.
Discounting the fact that the proximity of apartments often
adds to the speculative value of the surrounding property, there
is little evidence that an apartment per se will detract from
the value of surrounding land.2 t, Rather, the value of commercial property in the neighborhood will increase as a result
of the influx of population residing in the apartments. The
surrounding residents' argument of reduced property values is
further diluted when considering the aesthetic value an artistically designed and well-constructed apartment complex can
contribute to a community composed almost entirely of relatively standardized single-family dwellings.
One ramification of the "reduction in property value argument" is manifest in local zoning ordinances eliminating or restricting the location of apartment buildings. Notably, a few
suburbs have attempted to prohibit all multiple dwellings within
their corporate boundaries; however, in Spenoni v. Board of
Appeals of the City of Sterling2 the court expressly negated
the validity of such a prohibition. Moreover, the court in upholding the validity of the zoning ordinance, which denied the
plaintiff the right to construct an apartment building on his
property, stated: " . . . a municipality may not expressly prohibit the erection of apartment buildings or restrict permissible
locations to districts unfit for human habitation or already overcrowded with buildings of a permanent nature . . . "27
Some suburbs which seek to restrict the location of apartment buildings relegate multiple-family housing only to the
second floors of buildings in commercial zones. For example,
Lake Forest, Illinois, prior to a 1966 rezoning plan, prohibited the
construction of apartment buildings unless the ground floor was
occupied by stores or offices. Presently section 6 of the Lake
Forest Zoning Ordinance provides for the construction of separate multi-dwelling structures upon a lot containing a minimum
of 40,000 square feet. Further, more than one multi-dwelling
structure may be erected on a lot, zoned "0-1" (office district);
2
under certain prescribed conditions.
Another sophisticated device for restricting the location of
apartment buildings in order to protect the property values of
surrounding single-family homeowners is the "floating zone."
This device is designed to give the community a chance to
25 Shelger, Technique of Analyzing Residential Areas, REAL ESTATE
APPRAISAL PRACTICE 51, 57 (1958).
26 368 Ill. 568, 15 N.E.2d 302 (1938).
27 Id. at 572, 15 N.E.2d at 304.
28 LAKE FOREST, ILL., CODE ch. 46 (1971).
See Appendix, §6, 2.
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scrutinize each specific proposal for multi-family development
with a provision for a "floating zone" in the text of the local
zoning ordinance, but without a corresponding district on the
29
map.
A final restrictive device incorporated in local zoning ordinances is the so-called "buffer zone." This device provides that
multi-family housing districts are to be inserted between single-family and commercial districts. In Evanston Best & Co. v.
Goodman,"' the court upheld the validity of the 1921 Evanston
Zoning Ordinance establishing "buffer areas" on the ground
that while the existence of such areas was not necessary, its
creation was not an unreasonable exercise of police power.
The judicial ramification of the "reduction in property
value argument" is manifest by the court's consistent recognition of the zoning of surrounding property and the depreciative
effect on apartments as significant factors in determining the
validity of local zoning ordinances.3 1 Recently, the validity of
a local zoning ordinance restricting the interjection of multidwelling units into a predominantly single-family residential
area, on the ground that such a restriction protected against
depreciation of the surrounding land, was upheld on the basis
32
that it had a reasonable relationship to the public welfare.
(b)

Tax Increase (Cost-revenue Analysis)
Suburbanites frequently oppose the invasion of apartment
complexes, reasoning that "since multi-family dwellings do not
pay their own way, our taxes will be increased." From the limited number of local studies on this problem, it is clear that
multi-family housing does not per se have any particular effect
on municipal finances. 3 Rather, the real effect of apartments on
municipal costs is still a disputed question, as indicated by the
following two surveys:
(1) a report which concluded that
single-family homes cost more to serve than they pay, whereas apartments contribute to taxes over and above their costs
to the county because of fewer school-age children; and (2) a
study sponsored by School District #68 indicated that apartment use imposed a more serious drain on District #68's
29See
Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d
731 (1951).
30 369 111. 207, 16 N.E.2d 131, (1938).
3 See Viggiano v. City of Elmhurst, 67 Ill. App. 2d 140, 213 N.E.2d 571
(1966) and Mutual National Bank v. City of Chicago, 75 Ill. App. 2d 102,
221 N.E.2d 116 (1966).
32 Marquette National Bank v. Village of Oak Lawn, 65 Ill. App. 2d
286, 212 N.E.2d 502 (1965).

33

R.

MACE, MUNICIPAL

71-123 (1961).

COST

REVENUE RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES

10
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financial resources than did single-family residences34
These inconsistent results also tend to illustrate the inherent unreliability of cost-revenue surveys due to the absence
of uniform criteria and procedures for their preparation. The
relative ease with which the conclusions of cost-revenue surveys
can be manipulated is illustrated by the fact that most of these
studies are prepared by suburban municipalities in order to
"make a case" for a predetermined course of action. They are
designed specifically to provide a scientific basis for discouraging low and medium-priced residential uses.
Local legislatures, ignoring the above considerations, have
enacted ordinances subjecting the permission to build apartments to the performance of conditions designed to make
apartments pay their own way. One such technique is to require monetary payment or dedication of land for public purposes as a condition precedent to the issuance of a building
permit. This device has consistently been opposed by Illinois
courts as a valid tool for implementing the "increase in taxes
argument."
In Village of Downers Grove v. Rosen," the court lucidly
illustrated the current position of the judiciary on the soundness of this device. Here a suit was brought by a developer
who had been required, pursuant to the local zoning ordinance,
to deposit in escrow $325 for each lot sold as a condition to the
approval of his subdivision plot. These funds were eventually
to become the property of the school district. The court held
this requirement invalid on the ground that the Illinois Enabling Statute8 authorized only requirements of land dedication
and not monetary charges. The court also held invalid another section of the ordinance which required dedication of
land because it failed to fix adequate standards to effectively guide
the planning commission in determining the amount of land to be
dedicated. Subsequent to this decision, the Illinois legislature
and most local municipalities deleted those sections relating
to the establishment of or contribution to educational facilities.
A second device employed by some municipalities is to contract with developers who promise to dedicate land or pay
money in exchange for the suburb's promise to approve the lot
or provide improvements. In Board of Education v. E. A. Herzog Construction Co.,3 7 the court, in applying estoppel principles,
held that the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of a
34 Symposium, The Legal Significance of Cost Considerations in the
Regulation of Apartments by Suburbs, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 413 (1964).
85 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960).

36 [1949) Law of Illinois 456 (Repealed 1965).
37

29 Ill. App. 2d 138, 172 N.E.2d 645 (1961).
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written contract, which provided that in exchange for the
plaintiff's promise to persuade the Cook County Board to rezone
the subdivision for residential use, the defendant would contribute $95,000 to the school district for the contemplated construction of a new school. The court held that Rosen supported
the plaintiff's contention that the Board of Education was authorized to enter into voluntary agreements with subdividers to accept
payments to help defray the cost of erecting school buildings. 8
It seems that the Herzog court, instead of adopting the rationale of Rosen, was in effect circumventing it by distinguishing
"voluntary" from "involuntary" payments and exactions made
to local municipalities and those made to local school districts.
It is difficult to determine voluntariness when the coercion imposed by the economic necessity of obtaining a building permit
is considered.
A final devise utilized by municipalities to pacify those suburbanites fearful of a tax increase, due to apartment construction
in their community, is regulation aimed at increasing the
apartment building's tax base. A typical ordinance may require that the building be located on a lot containing a minimum
number of square feet per dwelling unit. 3 Ordinances of this
variety, which tend to increase municipal revenue by building
40
up the tax base, have been sustained by the Illinois courts.
It can reasonably be concluded that suburban communities desiring to restrict the development of apartments within their borders will encounter persistent judicial opposition
to the use of such direct techniques as monetary conditions,
land dedication and contracts. It is therefore evident that,
under the present judicial climate in Illinois, suburban communities may lawfully apply only those preventive measures
that are aimed at protecting the municipality's tax base.
(c)
Increase in Crime, Fire and Disease
The argument that the influx of apartment buildings in
the suburban community will increase crime, fire, or disease
is manifest by the often-quoted phrase, "protection of public
health, safety, morals, and welfare." In the landmark case of
Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 41 the Supreme Court of the United
States sustained the constitutional right of municipalities to
exercise their inherent police power to promulgate reasonable
zoning ordinances. The Court stated that a zoning ordinance
must be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and without sub38 Id. at 142, 172 N.E.2d at 647.

3 See Appendix, 36

1 (a).

40See Reitman v. Village of River Forest, 9 Ill. 2d 448, 137 N.E.2d
801 (1956).
41272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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general
stantial relation to public health, safety, morals, 4 or
2
unconstitutional.
declared
be
will
it
before
welfare
The Illinois Enabling Act 4. provides for the promotion of the
"public health, safety, comfort, morals, and welfare." The typical local zoning ordinance also employs this phrase in connection
with the approval by the Planning Commission of proposed apartment developments. 4' Hence, local municipalities, through the
state's police power, can exclude or restrict the construction of
apartment buildings, if they can conclusively prove a causal
relationship between multiple-dwelling units and a proportionate, or even unproportionate, increase in crime, fire, or disease.
However, no reported case to date has upheld the exclusion of
an apartment building based on substantial evidence of such a
causal connection.
(d) Increased Traffic Congestion
The irate suburbanite frequently argues that the construction of apartment buildings necessarily contributes substantial
numbers of motorists to already overcrowded city streets, causing considerable traffic congestion. The Supreme Court of Illi45
nois, in American Nat'l Bk. & Trust Co. v. County of Cook
held unconstitutional a single-family zoning classification on
property upon which the plaintiff was contemplating construction
of apartment buildings. In response to the defendant's allegation
of increased traffic as a result of the proposed construction of the
apartment building, the plaintiff's expert witness testified that
traffic would be no greater for the proposed multi-dwelling than
it would be for single-family dwellings. The court resolved the
issue by stating that the probability of increased traffic was not
sufficiently related to the proposed multiple dwelling to justify the
Further, the court in LaSalle
single-family classification.
Nat'l Bk. v. Village of Skokie4 6 held that even though traffic
is a factor in zoning, it is not in itself entitled to much weight,
since it is merely representative of an increasingly more aggravated problem in all but the most sheltered neighborhoods.
Although various local government legislatures have taken
cognizance of the problem by incorporating in the zoning ordinance provisions relating to "congestion in public streets" as a
factor determining the propriety of proposed apartment developments, 47 the possibility of increased traffic congestion continues
42 Id.
4. ILL. REV. STAT.

LAKE
4 27 Ill.
46 26 Ill.
47 LAKE
44

ch. 24, §11-13-1 (1971); Appendix A.
FOREST, ILL. CODE ch. 46 (1971).. See Appendix, §6, 112(b).
2d 468, 189 N.E.2d 305 (1963).
2d 143, 186 N.E.2d 46 (1962).
FOREST, ILL. CODE ch. 46 (1971). See Appendix, '6, 2(b,3).
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to play a relatively insignificant role in determining the validity
of a particular zoning classification.
(e)

Degradation of the "Character"
of the Neighborhood

Suburbanites contend that the "character" of their community must be protected from degradation resulting from the
invasion of apartments. The Illinois judiciary has recognized
this argument in the context of determining whether a purported exercise of the police power is so unreasonable and con48
fiscatory as to constitute an unlawful invasion of property.
In conjunction with the "character" argument, suburbanites demand the right to regulate the aesthetics of their community. Until recently, aesthetic considerations have provided
an insufficient legal basis for the invasion of property rights
9
via local zoning ordinances.4
In Neef v. City of Springfield,5 0 the plaintiff sought an injunction to bar enforcement of the zoning ordinance prohibiting the construction of a filling station in a residential zone in
which an intensive beautification program had been initiated.
The court, in discounting the aesthetic factor as a determinant
of the validity of the classification, stated:

[T]he question here . . .is whether or not, disregarding the evidence relating to the beauty of the neighborhood and the streets
and other aesthetic purposes, the ordinance should be sustained
on the grounds of public health, safety, morals and of general welfare. 1
In 1952, Lake Forest, Illinois provided the impetus for the
regulation of the aesthetics of buildings constructed in that
suburb. The rationale for the regulation is stated in the ordinance itself: "Excessive similarity, dissimilarity or inappropriateness in exterior design and appearance of new buildings
adversely affects neighboring areas. ' '52 The regulation provides
that when the Director of Building and Zoning in Lake Forest
believes that a proposed building may produce a harmful effect
on the community, he then refers the question to the Building
Review Board. The Board has authority to make recommendations on the question of similarity and dissimilarity along with
4SSee Galt v. County of Cook, 405 Ill. 396, 91 N.E.2d 395 (1950), for
a discussion of the due process and equal protection in this area.
49 See Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166 at 181; 180 N.E. 767 at 773 (1932).
50 380 Ill.
275, 43 N.E.2d 947 (1942).
51 Id. at 280, 43 N.E.2d at 950.
5- See CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, Feb. 28, 1969 at 17, col. 1.

14
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the quality of architectural design, landscaping, and construction material.Shortly after Lake Forest enacted the amendment regulating the aesthetics of buildings, the towns of Glenview and
Winnetka, Illinois also amended their zoning regulation, providing for control over the appearance of new buildings in their
communities.
According to the Superintendent of Public
Works of Winnetka, the restrictions on the appearance of
buildings are made to "maintain certain characteristics of the
community and eliminate others. ' ' 54 At the date of this writing,
there have been no reported cases testing the validity of these
"appearance codes."
The suburbanites' hostility toward the construction of
apartment buildings and their seemingly genuine desire to
regulate community appearances can produce interesting
paradoxes. For example, in the early 1960s, Lake Forest
amended its zoning ordinance to permit the construction of
new college dormitories both at Lake Forest College and at
Barat College, while at the same time resisting by various
means the construction of apartments. The rejected apartments
would have produced substantial tax revenues; they would have
been consistently occupied throughout the year; they would
have been occupied by middle-income wage earners; and the
apartments would have maintained the character of the neighborhood in which they were built. On the other hand, the
college dormitories are tax exempt and put a heavy burden on
municipal services; they are unoccupied targets for vandalism
for several months out of the year; they are occupied by an
inherently unstable and "obnoxious" element; and they differ
sharply in style and appearance from the large single-family
residences adjacent to the campuses.5 5
The glaring inconsistencies in the suburban zoning policy
illustrated by the above situation could serve as valuable evidence for the proposition that the commonly articulated arguments as to the odious effects of apartments, particularly the
alleged decrease in property values, increased taxes and traffic,
and degradation of the "character" of the community are
merely a subterfuge for the suburbanites' latent motives for
opposing the invasion of apartment buildings.
(2)
LATENT OBJECTIONS
The latent objections are those which are rarely mentioned
at local zoning meetings, rarely transcribed in the record of
53 CHICAGO DAILY NEWs,

54 Id.

Feb. 21, 1969 at 22, col. 1.

55 Symposium, Aesthetic Control of Land Use, A House Built Upon
the Sand, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 372, n.22 (1964).
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judicial proceedings, and usually described abstractly in sociology textbooks and treatises. Due to the inherent nature of
these objections, documentation of their existence and effect is
necessarily inadequate; nevertheless, a brief analysis is essential for apprehension of the deep-rooted problems facing zoning
litigants in Illinois today.
(a) Increased Influx of Transients
Traditionally, residents of rental housing have had higher
mobility ratios than home-owners.56 When the home-owner
decides to move, a buyer must first be found and the title transferred, which is often time consuming and expensive. It would
seem logical that persons contemplating moving in the near
future would choose the short-term lease rather than the
mortgage as the appropriate form of tenure. However, this
trend has subsided, and today the mobility rate of owner-occupants is much closer to that of tenants than it has been in the
past 7 Due to the wide variety in types of multi-family housing now being built in the suburbs, it is difficult to generalize
concerning both the influx and subsequent migration of transients. For example, the high-rise suburban condominium or
high-rise cooperative possesses the identical stabilizing attributes of the single-family residence, including high prices and
correspondingly high mortgages.
Also, large multi-family
housing complexes for elderly citizens are characterized by
their stabilizing attributes, since potential mobility is not
great. Thus, the validity of the suburbanites' argument that
apartments attract transients who have no local interest is
negated by the fact that a multi-family dweller is no longer a
standardized "tenant." 8
(b)
Influx of Blacks and Other Minority Groups
The typical suburbanite can be heard to say: "If we permit
them to build apartment buildings in our community they will
soon be renting them to Blacks."
Disregarding moral and
social issues involved in this argument, the suburbanites'
prophecy could eventually become a reality. The increasing
social pressure against racial discrimination in housing is
currently exhibited in "open occupancy" and other similar legislation designed to eradicate ghettos. Even though this movement is most active in the central city, the urban fringes cannot be expected to hold out indefinitely against this pattern.5 9
56Foote, Abu-Lug-Lod, Foley, Winnick, HOUSING CHOICES AND HOUSING
143 (1960).

CONSTRAINTS,
57 Id.

5s See Jacobson v. Village of Wilmette, 403 111. 250, 85 N.E.2d 753 (1949).
59 See MCENTIRE, RESIDENCE AND RACE, 107 (1960).
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When the suburban-housing discrimination barrier is scaled,
more economic apartment-type accommodations will be necessary to meet the demand of the less affluent minority groups.
The above cursory examination intimates that the actual
reasons behind the suburbanites' hostility toward the advent of
the apartment building in their community often lies in areas
outside the scope of judicial or legislative regulation.
II.

CONFRONTATION

An inevitable conflict results when the suburban landowner, motivated by the prospect of substantial monetary remuneration, attempts to construct an apartment building in an
area presently zoned exclusively for single-family residence.
The confrontation between the landowner and the local zoning
ordinance, representing the prejudices, fears, and financial investment of thousands of irate suburbanites effectively commences at the local zoning board of appeals meeting.
A.
(1)

FORMAL

LOCAL ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS
PROCEDURES

(ILLINOIS

ENABLING ACT)

Local zoning boards of appeals are granted jurisdiction by
the Illinois Enabling Act-° to entertain appeals from actions of
enforcement officers and to hear appeals for variance to relieve "practical difficulties or particular hardship.""
In addition to the above jurisdictional requirements, the
Act specifies the parties entitled to appeal to the local zoning
board. Appeals may be taken to the board by "any person
aggrieved or by any officer, department, board, or bureau of the
municipality.'6 2 Although no Illinois decision has concisely
articulated who is a "person aggrieved," New York, whose
enabling statute is similar to Illinois', has held that the owner
of property who has been denied a permit and who alleges a
misinterpretation of the ordinance provisions by the enforcement official or seeks a variance from the ordinance with
respect to his particular property, would be a "person aggrieved"
within the meaning of the ordinance, as would the board of
trustees of a municipality or a mayor challenging the decision
of an administrative officer.r3 Also, in Babitzke v. Village of
6 4 a party executing a binding
Harvester,
contract for the pur60ILL.
61 Id.
62

63

REV. STAT. ch. 24, §11-13-3(d) (1971).
§11-13-5.

Id. §11-18-12.
Tarrant v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn, 19 Misc. 2d 238, 187

N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 104 App. Div. 2d 37; 197 N.Y.S.2d
317 (1960), afi'd, 8 N.Y.2d 1129; 9 N.Y.S.2d 813, 171 N.E.2d 983 (1960).
04 32 11. App. 2d 289, 177 N.E.2d 644 (1961).
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chase of realty, conditioned on the grant of a zoning variance,
was held to have sufficient interest to apply for the variance.
The Illinois Enabling Act gives the local zoning boards
of appeals the jurisdiction to grant or recommend variations
to the legislature. The variation is a technique used to relieve the impact of the zoning ordinance in cases where a
"unique hardship" would result to the owner because of the
limitation placed on the use of his property. The grant of a
variation 5 must be based on a finding that "practical difficulties or particular hardship" exist due to the strict enforcement of the ordinance against the particular parcel of real
estate. Nevertheless, in Welton v. Hamilton,"6 the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that the grant of power to an administrative agency to allow variations was an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power without adequate standards.
The decision did not apply to variations granted by the local
legislative bodies; thus, many local governments circumvented
the Welton barrier by delegating to the zoning board of appeals
the duty to hold the necessary public hearings on a variation,
after which the board would recommend adoption or rejection
of the variation to the legislative body.,,
However, in Lindburg v. Zoning Board of Appeals," the
Illinois Supreme Court itself circumvented the Welton mandate,
and finally, in 1967, the Illinois State Legislature ignored the
decision when it amended the Enabling Act to provide that in
municipalities of over 500,000 population, only the board of zoning appeals could grant variations. 9 Even though the amendment
effectively revoked the power of the local legislature to grant
variations, it also recognized the power of the local zoning ordinance, enacted by the legislature, to limit the grant of variations
by the board of zoning appeals. 0 In municipalities of less than
500,000 population, variations could be granted either by the
zoning board of appeals or the local legislature, depending on
the language of the local zoning ordinance.7 1 Depending on
such factors as the population of the municipality, the location
of the property, and local administrative policies, it would
appear that the variation may be granted by the local legislative
body or an administrative zoning board of appeals.
The Act sets up various standards relating to zoning board
of appeals membership. For example, it specifies the number of
65 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §11-13-5 (1971).

G6 344 Ill. 82, 176 N.E. 333 (1931).
07 LAKE FOREST, ILL., CODE ch. 46 (1971).
08 8 Ill. 2d 254, 133 N.E.2d 266 (1956).
9 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §11-13-4 (1971).
70d.
71 d. at §11-13-5 (1971), See Appendix, art. 16, §3.
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members, the length of their terms, the procedure for the calling
of meetings, and the necessary vote for the reversal of a decision
of an administrative official.7 2 However, to the detriment of the
landowner requesting a hearing on the merits of his grievances by an impartial and knowledgeable panel, there are
no requirements in the Enabling Act concerning the knowledge
or experience of the board members. Moreover, this problem
is compounded by the fact that the zoning board members are
usually appointed by the mayor of the local municipality, confirmed by the legislative body, and subject to removal only
"for cause" by the mayor or the local legislative body.7 3 Hence,
the resolution of complex legal, economic, and social issues is
seemingly entrusted to a legally and procedurally uneducated
body.
(2)
INFORMAL PROCEDURES
The inequities endured by the aggrieved landowner at the
administrative level are not primarily a consequence of the
above formalities enumerated in the Enabling Act, but instead
result from the virtual absence of formal procedures for the
conducting of local zoning board proceedings. The Act justifiably gives substantive freedom to the municipalities, but improperly extends that latitude to administrative procedures. The Act
authorizes each municipality to adopt and provide for the administration of its own zoning laws.14 The restraints imposed upon
the municipality in promulgating rules of procedure are minimal.
For example, the meetings are required to be open to the public,
minutes of the proceedings must be kept, a quorum must be present, and all rules and decisions of the board are to be filed for
public record. 75 These requirements are wholly inadequate to
guarantee a fair and orderly administrative hearing, as the
subsequent discussion will indicate.
The Illinois Enabling Act provides that an appeal to the
local zoning board is to be made by the filing of a notice of
appeal, supported by the grounds thereof.7 6 Generally, the purpose of the pleadings is to formulate issues and inform a litigant
of his adversary's position so that he may properly prepare
a defense and support his position. But, it should be noted
that there is no provision in either the Act or local zoning
ordinances requiring the municipality to file written objections
prior to the hearing. Thus, the landowner must prove himself
entitled to relief, or at least he is forced to divulge the legal
72 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §11-13-3 (1971).
3 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §11-13-3 (1967),

141Id. §11-13-1.
75 Id. §11-13-3.
76 Id. §11-13-12.

See Appendix, art. 16, §1.

1972]

Zoning in Suburbia

19

basis of his cause of action knowing in advance what arguments may be raised and what evidence ie will need to
refute.
The local zoning board of appeals is an administrative
agency, therefore, strict rules of evidence do not apply to its
relatively informal proceedings.Indicative of this informality, it was noted in Rosenfield v. Zoning Board of Appeals
of Chicag078 that the zoning board had refused to hear the testimony of an expert witness because, "we remember him," and
the same board observed at the beginning of a hearing, "that
we know all about this lot."
Another more serious problem confronting claimants in
Illinois' administrative agencies is the lack of ethics, customarily deemed essential in any legal system through which substantial property rights must be settled. One such example
was an oral directive by a zoning board employee concerning
the anticipated future action of the administrative body which
brought the plaintiff to court prematurely.7
Also, members of
the board of appeals have participated in hearings involving
8 0
matters in which they had a direct interest.
Obviously, hidden interests in zoning disputes would not be consistent with
basic due process requirements, but apparently this is a matter
courts cannot consider. The court, in Village of Justice v.
James C. Jamieson,81 in response to the plaintiff's allegation
that employees of the zoning board had hidden interests in the
zoning dispute, stated:

rW]hile the complaint makes charges involving employees of the
County Board, no facts of which a court can take legal cognizance
are presented. If there is substance to plaintiff's charges with respect to these employees, it is 8 a2s matter for the County Board to
consider and not for the courts.
Another unethical and unauthorized procedure of local
zoning boards is the practice of the Cook County Board of Appeals to condition recommendation for amendments to the
execution of restrictive covenants by the plaintiff.82 The Illinois
judiciary has intervened, however, where the local municipality
had perpetrated a blatant injustice upon a zoning dispute
4
claimant. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. City of Park Ridge,1
"7Flick v. Gately, 328 Ill. App. 81, 65 N.E.2d 137 (1946).
78 111. App. 2d 447. 154 N.E.2d 323 (1958).
79 13 Ill. 2d 493, 150 N.E.2d 97 (1958).
80 10 Ill. 2d 132, 139 N.E.2d 218 (1956) ; cert. denied, 353 U.S. 987, 358
U.S. 896 rehearingdenied, 358 U.S. 913.
81 7 111. App. 2d 113. 129 N.E.2d 269 (1955).
82 Id. at 118, 129 N.E.2d at 271.
8 Dallstream and Hunt, Variations, Exceptions and Special Uses, 1954
U. ILL. L. FORUM 213, 236.
8416

Ill. App. 2d 555, 149 N.E.2d 344 (1958).
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the Illinois Appellate Court held the refusal to issue a permit
for an allowed use, merely because the municipality wanted
time to amend the ordinance to forbid the offending, but permitted use, was improper.
Additional inequitable and unethical practices and procedures of local zoning boards of
appeals in Illinois include: (1) no formal transcript of the proceedings; (2) board decisions based on unsworn testimony;
(3) no examination by the board of the property in question;
and (4) the delegation to one member of the power to conduct a
hearing when the docket is full.85 It can be concluded from the
preceding discussion that the Illinois legislature's failure to
establish comprehensive and uniform- administrative procedures has produced a chaotic and inequitable system for resolving disputes between aggrieved landowners and the local
zoning authorities.
B.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE LOCAL ZONING BOARD'S DECISION

The Illinois courts, in a concerted effort to avoid their functioning as a "super zoning commission," have abstained from
exercising dominance over zoning controversies, and thereby
have enhanced the local municipalities' administrative and legislative powers. Thus, the zoning litigant, appealing to the
courts from an adverse decision by a disorganized and biased
zoning board, will encounter several judicially created obstacles
designed to preserve the integrity and authority of the local
zoning boards. The Illinois Supreme Court6 has articulated the
court's function in zoning disputes by stating that "matters
of policy, or the wisdom and desirability of a particular re'8 7
straint, are not within the domain of judicial competence.
Moreover, it has held that judgments of municipal authorities,
such as local zoning boards of appeals, will not be disturbed,
unless they are shown to be arbitrary or unrelated to public
welfare.
Another obstacle to an objective judicial determination is
the presumption that the zoning board of appeals' findings of
fact are prima facie true, and the courts will not disturb those
findings unless they constitute an abuse of discretion.8
If the petitioner did not have the foresight to engage the
services of a reporter at the administrative hearing, his right
to judicial review could be irreparably prejudiced. The Illinois
Supreme Court has made it clear that persons who pursue
85 Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning Administration in Illinois,
26 U. CHI. L. REV.509 (1959).

86 10 Ill. 2d 178, 139 N.E.2d 270 (1956).
87 Id. at 180, 139 N.E.2d at 272.
88 Dawson v. Board of Appeals, 41 Ill.
App. 2d 125, 190 N.E.2d 123
(1963).
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relief from administrative channels must preserve a sufficient
record at all stages of the proceedings.," If the administrative body fails to preserve a record, the proceeding is effective, and the circuit court will have no jurisdiction to commence
a trial de novo; if the record is insufficient the case will be
remanded.9 ° Further, even if a record is preserved at the administrative level, the local zoning board of appeals' decision
cannot be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of
evidencey 1
Thus, considering the absence of formalized administrative procedures, which are necessarily essential to guarantee
the zoning litigant a fair and unbiased determination of his
rights, coupled with the self-exclusionary policies of the judiciary, it becomes evident that the state legislature is the
appropriate forum for the reformation of the chaotic state of
zoning administration in Illinois.

III.

POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM

The Illinois Enabling Act should be amended to provide for
the creation of a state-wide zoning commission, authorized to
perform a dual function.
First, establishing uniform and
comprehensive procedures for the conducting of local zoning
boards of appeals hearings; prescribing specific, well-defined
standards relating to substantive determinations. The establishment of uniform procedures *and standards would not deprive local municipalities of the autonomous control over local
land use determinations, but, rather, it would insure to every
owner of real estate, wherever it is located in the state, a
judgment based on general standards and rendered according to uniform procedures.
Some possible procedures for
the conducting of local boards of zoning appeals include:
mandatory formal pleadings; application of basic rules of evidence; all testimony taken under oath; confining testimony
and evidence to relevant issues under consideration; a mandatory requirement for formal transcripts to be made at every
hearing; provision for positions on the board for a lawyer, real
estate broker, member of the planning commission, building contractor, and local businessman, all to be paid a salary commensurate with the time expended in performing their functions; and a requirement that the board clearly articulate the
rationale of its decisions.
89 Strohl v. Macon County Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 411 Ill. 559. 104
N.E.2d 612 (1952).
90Id. at 563, 104 N.E.2d at 615.
91 Kaufman v. City of Highwood, 91 Il1. App. 2d 196, 233 N.E.2d 230
(1968).
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The second function of the commission would be to hear
appeals from final decisions of local zoning boards or legislative bodies. This would materially help to alleviate the congested
court dockets. Since most of the zoning disputes do not require a determination of law but rather a detailed factual analysis, the commission could make objective factual determinations, which would be impossible at the local zoning board level
due to intricate political pressures. The commission would be
non-partisan, composed of educated and experienced technicians
in the fields of real estate, law, planning and business. Where
complex legal problems are involved, the commission could be
vested with the authority to certify a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois. The state-wide commission would be
able to objectively consider and resolve inter-municipality planning problems, not possible at the local level due to various
vested rights and animosities between adjacent municipalities.
The commission could also coordinate the policies of the local
zoning boards, provide services, and disseminate relevant information to the various administrative bodies.
The state-wide zoning commission, briefly outlined above,
would be the most appropriate and practical solution for
eradicating the unjust and haphazard administration of zoning
disputes prevailing in Illinois today.
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APPENDIX
LAKE FOREST ZONING ORDINANCE
6. Additional Multiple Dwelling Unit Regulations
1. Specific Requirements
(a) Separate multiple dwelling structures shall be
located upon a lot or parcel containing a minimum
of forty thousand (40,000) square feet.
(b) Living quarters shall not be constructed below
the finished grade adjacent to the multiple dwelling structure.
2. More than one multiple dwelling structure may be allowed on a lot or parcel in the "0-1" Office District under the following conditions:
(a) Procedure - Plan Commission Considerations.
The applicant shall submit for consideration by
the Plan Commission:
(1) A statement describing the general character of the intended development together
with such other pertinent information as
may be necessary to determine the requirements of this Ordinance and the general standards established herein.
(2) A general development plan showing:
a. The intended use of land.
b. The dimensions and location of proposed structures.
c. The dimensions and location of areas
to be reserved for vehicular and pedestrian circulation.
d. The dimensions and location of areas
to be reserved for parking.
e. The dimensions and location of areas
to be used for landscaping, recreation
and open space.
(3) The Plan Commission may recommend
modification of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of
Section 5 of Article VIII of these regulations.
(b) Basis for Plan Commission Recommendation.

SECTION

Before recommending approval of such development, the Plan Commission shall determine that:
(1) Such development will create an attractive
residential environment of sustained desirability and economic stability, com-
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patible with the established character of
the area in which it is proposed.
(2) Adequate provision has been made for
(i) landscaping and fencing for screening
purposes, (ii) ingress and egress to cause
minimum interference with traffic flow on
abutting streets and (iii) off-street parking and service facilities.
(3) The use is so designed, located, and proposed to be operated as not to impair an
adequate supply of light and air to adjacent property or unreasonably increase the
congestion in public streets, or increase
the danger of fire or endanger the public
safety, or diminish the taxable value of
land within the surrounding area, or in
any other respect impair the public health,
safety, comfort, morals or welfare of the
inhabitants of The City of Lake Forest.
ARTICLE IX
"B-I"

NEIGHBORHOOD

SHOPPING

DISTRICT

REGULATIONS

1. The regulations set forth in this Article or set forth
elsewhere in this Ordinance when referred to in this Article,
are the regulations in the "B-I" Neighborhood Shopping District.
SECTION

SECTION 2. Use Regulations: A building or premises shall be
used only for the following purposes:
1. Any use permitted in the "0-1" Office District except
that apartments and multiple dwelling units will be
permitted only where located above the first floor of a
building to be used for business purposes.
2. Any local retail business or service established which
supplies commodities or services primarily for residents
of the surrounding neighborhood, such as grocery stores,
meat markets, drug stores, shoe and radio repair shops,
barber shops, clothes cleaning or laundry pickup stations and banks.
3. Restaurants where there is no dancing or entertainment.
4. Greenhouses operated as a retail business.
5. Public and private off-street parking areas.
(a) within seventy (70) feet of the established center
line of pavement of that portion of Waukegan
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Road (Illinois State Highway Route 42-A) that
is located within the corporate limits of The City
of Lake Forest, Illinois;
(b) within thirty (30) feet of the westerly line of the
existing right-of-way of that portion of Skokie
Highway extending from Buena Road northerly
to Old Elm Road;
(c) within fifty-three (53) feet of the established
center line of Everett Road, Telegraph Road,
Conway Road, Old Elm Road, and Buena Road.
ARTICLE XVI
BOARD OF APPEALS
SECTION 1. Membership. A Board of Appeals is hereby authorized to be established. The word "Board" when used in
this Ordinance shall be construed to mean the Board of Appeals. The Board shall consist of seven (7) members appointed
by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council. At least one
(1) member of the Board shall be a member of the Plan Commission. The members of the Board shall serve respectively
for the following terms: one for one (1) year, one for two (2)
years, one for three (3) years, one for four (4) years, one for
five (5) years, one for six (6) years, and one for seven (7)
years; the successor to each member so appointed shall serve
for a term of five (5) years. One (1) of the members so appointed shall be named as Chairman of the Board by the Mayor
and confirmed by the City Council at the time of his appointment, and shall hold his office as such Chairman until his successor is appointed. The Mayor and City Council have the
power to remove any member of the Board for cause after a
public hearing. Vacancies in the Board shall be filled for the
unexpired term of the member whose place has become vacant
in the manner herein provided for the appointment of such
member.
SECTION 2. Meetings. All meetings of the Board shall be held
at the call of the Chairman and at such other times as the
Board may determine. The Chairman, or in his absence, the
acting Chairman, may administer oaths and compel the attendance of witnesses. All meetings of the Board shall be open to
the public. The Board shall keep minutes of its proceedings
showing the vote of each member upon every question, or if
absent or failing to vote, indicating such fact, and shall also
keep records of its examinations, hearings and other official
actions. Every rule, regulation, every amendment or repeal
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thereof, and every order, requirement, decision, or determination of the Board shall immediately be filed in the office of the
Board and shall be a public record. The Board shall adopt its
own rules of procedure, but such rules shall: not be in conflict
with the statute authorizing the creation of such Board.
SECTION 3. Appeals to the Board. An appeal may be taken
from the Administrative Officer by any person aggrieved or by
an officer, department, board or bureau of the City. Such appeal shall be taken within such time as shall be prescribed by
the Board of Appeals by general rule, by filing with the Administrative Officer and with the Board of Appeals, a notice of
appeal, specifying the grounds thereof. The officer from whom
the appeal is taken shall forthwith transmit to the Board all of
the papers constituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken.
An appeal stays all proceedings in furtherance of the action appealed from, unless the Administrative Officer certifies
to the Board of Appeals after the notice of appeal has been
filed with him that by reason of facts stated in the certificate,
a stay would, in his opinion, cause imminent peril to life or
property, in which case the proceedings shall not be staid
otherwise than by a restraining order which may be granted
by the Board of Appeals or by a court of record on application,
on notice to the Administrative Officer and on due cause shown.
The Board of Appeals shall fix a reasonable time for the
hearing of the appeal and give due notice thereof to the parties
and decide the same within a reasonable time. Upon the hearing, any party may appear in person or by agent, or by Attorney. The Board of Appeals may reverse or affirm wholly or
partly or modify the order, requirement, decision or determination as in its opinion ought to be made in the premises and to
that end shall have all the powers of the Administrative Officer.
The concurring vote of four (4) members of the Board shall
be necessary to reverse any order, requirement, decision or determination of the Administrative Officer upon which it is required to act or to recommend any variation or modification in
this Ordinance to The City Council.
No exception or variation shall be considered or acted
upon by the Board until after a public hearing has been held
by the Board of which there shall be a notice of the time and
place of the hearing published at least once, not more than
thirty (30) nor less than fifteen (15) days before the hearing
in one or more newspapers published in or with a general cir-
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culation within The City of Lake Forest, such notice to contain
the particular location for which the exception or variation is
required as well as a brief statement of what the proposed exception or variation consists.
SECTION 4. Review. All final administrative decisions of the
Board of Appeals shall be subject to judicial review pursuant
to the provisions of the "Administrative Review Act," approved
May 8, 1945, and all amendments and modifications thereof,
and the rules adopted pursuant thereto.
5. Powers and Duties. The Board of Appeals shall
have the following powers and it shall be its duty:
SECTION

1. To hear and recommend to the City Council upon appeals
where it is alleged there is error of law in any order,
requirement, decision or determination made by the Administrative Officer in the enforcement of this Ordinance.
2. In hearing and recommending upon appeals the Board
shall have the power to recommend an exception in the
following instances:
(a) To permit the extension of a district where the
boundary line of a district divides a lot or tract
held in a single ownership on the effective date
of this Ordinance.
(b) To interpret the provisions of this Ordinance in
such a way as to carry out the intent and purpose
of the plan, as shown upon the map fixing the
several districts, accompanying and made a part
of this Ordinance, where the street layout actually on the ground varies from the street layout as shown on the map aforesaid.
(c) To permit the reconstruction of a non-conforming building which has been damaged by explosion, fire, act of God, or the public enemy, to the
extent to more than fifty (50) per cent of its
value, where the Board finds some compelling
necessity requiring a continuance of the nonconforming use is not to continue a monopoly.
(d) To waive or reduce the parking and loading requirements in any of the districts whenever the
character or use of the building is such as to
make unnecessary the full provision of parking
or loading facilities, or where such regulations
would impose an unreasonable hardship upon the
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use of the lot, as contrasted with merely granting
an advantage or a convenience.
(e)

To permit land within three hundred (300) feet
of a church to be improved for the parking
spaces required in connection with the church but
only when there is positive assurance that such
land will be used for such purpose during the
existence of the church.

(f) To determine whether an activity should be permitted within the "B-2" Business or "S-1" Service Districts because of the methods by which
it would be operated and because of its effect
upon uses within surrounding zoning districts.
(g) To permit in undeveloped sections of the city,
the issuance of temporary and conditional permits for not more than two (2) years for structures and uses in contravention of the use regulations controlling Residence Districts; provided
such uses are important to the development of
such undeveloped sections and also provided such
uses are not prejudicial to the adjoining and
neighboring sections already developed.
(h) In the "S-1" Service District the granting of permission to devote premises to uses that may be
carried on not primarily for the purposes of
supplying services or commodities for consumption or use in The City of Lake Forest; provided
that such use will not seriously injure the appropriate use of neighboring property.
3. The Board shall make recommendations upon applications for the following variations:
(a) To permit a variation in the yard requirements
of any district where there are unusual and practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in the
carrying out of these provisions due to an irregular shape of the lot, topographical or other conditions, provided such variation will not seriously
affect any adjoining property or the general
welfare.
(b) To permit a variation within the building setback
lines of Article XIV but only when such adjustments are made that would meet the objectives
of the regulations and when such variation will
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not merely constitute a convenience or individual
advantage.
(c) To permit a variation in the height of a building where such building is erected with a frontage
on a public waterway or on a natural hillside, but
such variation shall be made only for the purpose
of adjusting the height limits so as to conform
with that of neighboring structures.
(d) To authorize, whenever a property owner can
show that a strict application of the terms of this
Ordinance relating to the use, construction or alterations of buildings or structures or the use of
land will impose upon him unusual and practical
difficulties or particular hardship, such variations
of the strict application of the terms of this Ordinance as are in harmony with its general purpose and intent, but only when the Board is satisfied that a granting of such variation will not
merely serve as a convenience to the applicant,
but will alleviate some demonstrable and unusual
hardship or difficulty so great as to practically
deprive the owner of any use of the property and
thus warrant a variation from the comprehensive
plan as established by this Ordinance, but at the
same time, the surrounding property will be
properly protected.
In considering all appeals and all proposed exceptions or
variations to this Ordinance, the Board shall, before recommending any exceptions or variations from the Ordinance in a
specific case, first determine that it will not impair an adequate
supply of light and air to adjacent property or unreasonably
increase the congestion in public streets, or increase the danger
of fire or endanger the public safety, or diminish the taxable
value of land within the surrounding area, or in any other respect impair the public health, safety, comfort, morals or welfare of the inhabitants of The City of Lake Forest.
SECTION 6. Action by City Council. Upon receipt of the recommendations of the Board, the City Council may by ordinance
without further public hearing adopt any proposed variation
or may refer it back to the Board for further consideration.
Every such variation shall be accompanied by a finding of fact
specifying the reason for making such variation. Any proposed variation which fails to receive the approval of the Board
of Appeals shall not be passed except by the favorable vote of
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two thirds of all the elected members of the City Council.
7. Fee. A fee of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) to
cover the approximate cost of the procedure, shall be paid to
the Administrative Officer at the time the notice of appeal is
filed, which the Administrative Officer shall forthwith pay over
to the City Treasurer to the credit of the general revenue fund
of the City of Lake Forest.
SECTION

(as amended by ordinance, March 5, 1962)

